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GoQuiet

A Shadowsocks plugin that obfuscates the traffic as normal HTTPS traffic to non-blocked websites through domain fronting and disguises the proxy server as a normal webserver.

This software has been proven stable but it's not frequently maintained. Please check out the upgrade to this project Cloak, which provides 10% to 50% faster web page loading with multi-user support

The fundamental idea of obfuscating shadowsocks traffic as TLS traffic is not original. simple-obfs and ShadowsocksR's tls1.2_ticket_auth mode have shown this to be effective. This plugin has made improvements so that the goal of this plugin is to make indiscriminate blocking of HTTPS servers (or even IP ranges) with high traffic the only effective way of stopping people from using shadowsocks.

Beyond the benefit of bypassing the firewall, it can also cheat traffic restrictions imposed by ISP. See here.

This plugin has been tested on amd64 and arm Linux and amd64 Windows. It uses about the same CPU and memory as shadowsocks-libev (which is very little), and has almost no transmission overhead added on top of shadowsocks.

Download

Download the binaries here

or if you are deploying it on a server, you can use the automated script here.

Build

gq-client requires go1.11+. gq-server doesn't require any particularly new version of go.

make client or make server

or use the automated script here to build shadowsocks-libev and GoQuiet server from source.

Usage

Change the key in config file before using it. It can be the same as shadowsocks' password

You can check Instructions for Windows users

Plugin mode

For server:

ss-server -c <path-to-ss-config> --plugin <path-to-gq-server-binary> --plugin-opts "<path-to-gqserver.json>"

For client:

ss-local -c <path-to-ss-config> --plugin <path-to-gq-client-binary> --plugin-opts "<path-to-gqclient.json>"

or as value of plugin and plugin_opts in Shadowsocks JSON

{
    "server":"0.0.0.0",
    "server_port":443,
    "local_address": "127.0.0.1",
    "local_port":1080,
    "password":"mypassword",
    "timeout":300,
    "method":"aes-128-gcm",
    "fast_open":false,
    "reuse_port":true,
    "no_delay":true,
    "plugin":"path-to-gqserver/client-binary",
    "plugin_opts":"path-to-gqserver/client.json"
}

Alternatively, plugin_opts can be the configuration options separated by semi-colons. For example:

"plugin_opts":"WebServerAddr=204.79.197.200:443;Key=exampleconftest"

Keys cannot have = " ; in them

Standalone mode

Standalone mode should only be used if your shadowsocks port does not support plugins

For server:

gq-server -r 127.0.0.1:8388 -c <path-to-gqserver.json>
ss-server -c <path-to-ss-config> -s 127.0.0.1 -p 8388

For client:

gq-client -s <server_ip> -l 1984 -c <path-to-gqclient.json>
ss-local -c <path-to-ss-config> -s 127.0.0.1 -p 1984 -l 1080

Configuration

For server:

WebServerAddr is the redirection address and port when the incoming traffic is not from shadowsocks. It should correspond to the IP record of the ServerName set in gqclient.json

Key is the key. This needs to be the same as the Key set in gqclient.json

For client:

ServerName is the domain you want to make the GFW think you are visiting

Key is the key

TicketTimeHint is the time needed for a session ticket to expire and a new one to be generated. Leave it as the default.

Browser is the browser you want to make the GFW think you are using, it has NOTHING to do with the web browser or any web application you are using on your machine. Currently, chrome and firefox are supported.

How it works

As mentioned above, this plugin obfuscates shadowsocks' traffic as TLS traffic. This includes adding TLS Record Layer header to application data and simulating TLS handshake. Both of these are trivial to implement, but by manipulating data trasmitted in the handshake sequence, we can achieve some interesting things.

A TLS handshake sequence is initiated by the client sending a ClientHello message. We are interested in the field random and extension:session_ticket. Accroding to rfc5246, the random field is the current 32bit unix time concated with 28 random bytes. However, in most implementations all the 32 bytes are randomly generated (source: Wireshark). The session_ticket extension triggers a mechanism called session resumption, which allows the server to skip a lot of steps, most notably the Certificate message sent by the server. If you don't have a valid TLS certificate, you'll have to compose an invalid cert, which is a strong feature indicating that the server is a proxy. With the session_ticket's presence, we don't need to give out this information.

The client side of this plugin composes the ClientHello message using this procedure:

# Global variables
#   In config file:
preshared_key = '[A key shared out-of-band]'
ticket_time_hint = 3600 # In TLS implementations this is the time in seconds for a session ticket to expire. 
                        # Common values are 300,3600,7200 and 100800

#   Calculated on startup:
aes_key = sha256(preshared_key)
opaque = rand32int()

# Random:
iv = randbytes(16)
goal = sha256(str(floor(gettimestamp()/(12*60*60))) + preshared_key)
rest = aes_encrypt(iv,aes_key,goal[0:16])
random = iv + rest

# Session ticket
ticket = randbytes(192,seed=opaque+aes_key+floor(gettimestamp()/ticket_time_hint)))

Once the server receives the ClientHello message, it checks the random field. If it doesn't pass, the entire ClientHello is sent to the web server address set in the config file and the server then acts as a relay between the client and the web server. If it passes, the server then composes and sends ServerHello, ChangeCipherSpec, Finished together, and then client sends ChangeCipherSpec, Finished together. There are no useful informations in these messages. Then the server acts as a relay between the client and the shadowsocks server.

Replay prevention

The gettimestamp()/(12*60*60) part is there to prevent replay:

The random field should be unique in each ClientHello. To check its uniqueness, the server caches the value of the random field. Obviously we cannot cache every random forever, we need to regularly clean the cache. If we set the cache expiration time to, say 12 hours, replay attemps within 12 hours will fail, but if the firewall saves the ClientHello and resend it 12 hours later, that message will pass the check on the server and our proxy is exposed. However, when gettimestamp()/(12*60*60) is in place, the replayed message will never pass the check because for replays within 12 hours, they fail to the cache; for replays after 12 hours, they fail to the uniqueness of the value of gettimestamp()/(12*60*60) for every 12 hours.

Notes on the web server

If you want to run a functional web server on your proxy machine, you need it to have a domain and a valid certificate. As for the domain, you can either register one at some cost, or use a DDNS service like noip for free. The certificate can be obtained from Let's Encrypt for free. The certificate is for your web server (e.g. Apache and Nginx) only. The GoQuiet plugin does not need a certificate.

https://dcamero.azurewebsites.net/shadowsocks-goquiet.html - Detailed guide about "How to make your traffic look like simple tls traffic"

Or you can set the WebServerAddr field in the server config file as an external IP, and set the ServerName field in the client config file as the domain name of that ip. Because of the Server Name Indication extension in the ClientHello message, the firewall knows the domain name someone is trying to access. If the firewall sends a ClientHello message to our proxy server with an SNI we used, the destination IP specified in WebServerAddr will receive this ClientHello message and the web server on that machine will check the SNI entry against its configuration. If they don't match, the web server will refuse to connect and show an error message, which could expose the fact that our proxy machine is not running a normal TLS web server. If you match the external IP with its domain name (e.g. 204.79.197.200 to www.bing.com), our proxy server will become, effectively to the observer, a server owned by that domain.

Support me

If you find this project useful, donations are greatly appreciated!

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